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Chapter

1

Introduction

The United Nations sprang

to

life,

creating a

commendable

suppressing the Iraqi aggression during the recent Gull

and

security.

It

was then

for tlie first

the United Nations and realized

its

record, after successfully

War and

restoring the peace

time the world witnessed the true power of

efficacy as a world organization in disciplining

the states" behavior to conform to the principles oi international law.

The

entire

machinery of enforcement of international law

Security Council, pursuant to the enormous powers granted
of the United Nations, thereby

making the success

is

upon

controlled by the
it

by the Charter

or failure of the United Nations

a reflection of the Security Council's performance.

The Charter

places primary responsibility for maintaining international peace

and security on the Security Council. The duties

of the Security Council towards

maintaining international peace and security are two

fold: first, to facilitate

peaceful

settlements of international disputes; and second, failing a nonviolent solution, to

apply diplomatic, economic, and political sanctions, in order to restore the peace.

Both these functions primarily involve interpretation and implementation

^

of

international law.

This Article comprehensively analyses the manner in which the Security council,
in the process of carrying

out

its

functions, interprets and implements the interna-

tional legal principles set forth in the

^U.N. Chs.

U.N. Charter.

VI and VII of the Charter.

The nature

of its functions

See Christopher John Sabec, The Security

Council coines of age: An analysis of the international
of Kuwait, 21 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 63 (1991).
1

legal

response to the Iraqi invasion

2
is

such that, despite being a pohtical body,

of issues concerning

enumerated

in the

it

is

engaged

in

deahng with a variety

one or more principles of international law, most of which are

U.N. Charter, and which

After a brief explanation of

is

discussed in the second chapter.

how the function

of pacific settlement of disputes

necessitates the Security Council to interpret the international legal princi]>lcs. the

third chapter focuses on the theories of interpretation of basically the U.N. Charter,

because, Charter being an

former

is

embodiment

of those principles, interpretation of the

not possible without the interpretation of the Charter.

Tlie fourth chapter specifically analyses certain significant Charter provisions

that involve important legal principles and discusses the
l)y

the Security Council.

mode

of

its

interpretation

Finally, the fifth chapter explains with illustrations

how

the Council applied the legal norms in a given factual situation, and enforced them.

The date

of publication of all writings that

of drafting this Article

is

no

later

have been researched

than December, 1994.

for the

purpose

Chapter

2

International Law and the Security Council

2.1

Aspects of international law within the realm of the Security

Council
'Peace' was the only

dream and

desire of the frustrated international society after the

disastrous world wars. Their thirst for peace culminated in the birth of the United

Nations, an organization primarily established to maintain international peace and

The Charter

security.

United Nations, wherein the principles of law

of the

world peace are incorporated,

is

given paramount importance, and

is

for

considered a

multilateral treaty or a fundamental instrument that governs the conduct of the
states that agreed to adopt those principles

by attesting their signatures.

form and stability to the organs, emphasizes general goals, and by
procedures maintains a balance

among

universal, regional,

its

It

gives

principles

and

and national authorities,

and between the powers of public agencies and the rights of persons and nations.

The

II.

ot action

N. Charter consists of rules for an organization of states and for the limits

on the part of their governments. These rules are cast

oljligations,

Charter

^

form

binding on states and accepted as such by their governments.

itself is

binding law.

in the

of legal

The U.N.

described by jurists as a multilateral convention, a treaty that

^

^QUINCY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS
(i9G0).

^PETER

is

R.

BAEHR & LEON GORDENKER, THE UN

IN

THE

1990'S 3 (1992).

22

4
Since

tlie

law of international institutions

is

nothing but a specialized branch of

general (customary) international law upon which
principles of international law are as
in regional treaties,

rests,

it

much enshrined

in

it

is

not surprising that

the U.N. Charter as they are

and when the United Nations was being established, serious

"^

attention was given to ensuring that the principles of the Charter
legal

norms

for all states to

became immutable

be strictly abided by. The Charter states

in

no uncertain

terms that 'the organization shall ensure that states which are not members of the

United Nations act
for the

in

accordance with these principles so far as

maintenance of international peace and

basic principles of

The new
collective

modern

"*

security.

international law and order.

may

The Charter

also affirms

^

international principles of the U.N. Charter prohibits and provides for

measures to prevent aggressive war by

peace and security, assuring

ecjual rights

and

states. ^
self

Maintaining International

determination of people, orga-

nizing international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural
tarian problems,
rights

be necessary

and engaging

and humani-

in international actions to assure respect for

human

and fundamental freedoms are the fundamental principles emphasized by the

C'harter.

Each would

recjuire significant

development

of international law.

''

^R. A. AKINDELE, THE ORGANIZATION AND PROMOTION OF WORLD
PEACE: A STUDY OF UNIVERSAL-REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 67 (1976).
-^U.N. Charter art. 2(6). .Set WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1987). See also A. P. MOVCHAN, THE CONCEPT
AND MEANING OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 129 (1974).
'''"A

major purpose of the United Nations

is

to assure the observance of

human

rights,

the self-determination of peoples, and the economic, social and cultural progress of

all

uiankiud. These purposes (Preamble and Articles 1,53, 73, 76) are intended as guides to
"international cooperation' through the United Nations

QUINC:Y WRIGHT,

OF WAR

IN

THE ELIMINATION

49 (1961).

DORSEY, BEYOND THE UNITED NATIONS: CHANGING DISCOURSE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND LAW 52 (1986).

^'GRAY
IN

and the Speciahzed Agencies." See

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

^M

L.

at 41

5

The Charter

tledicated the United Nations to be "a center for hannoiiiziug the

actions of nations" in pursnit of certain
of international peace

and security

is

common

aims. Of these, the maintenance

the United Nations' primary and continuing

^
ta.sl<.

The Preamble
Ihiitetl

Nations

identical with
in

United Nations "declares as an 'end' of the

of the Charter of the

"to

save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,' whicii

what the preamble declares a means

peace with one another as good neighbors,'

security,'

interest."

and to ensure

...

that

armed

'to

for this end:

'to live

is

together

maintain international peace and

force shall not be used, save in the

common

'^

With maintenance

and security

of international peace

as the

primary objective,

various principles of international law are enshrined in the Charter of the United

Nations, and each constitute a fundamental

because their recognition
tlieir a.doi)tion

is

norm

of international law, primarily

strengthened by the significance of the Charter and by

by a vast majority of the

states.

These principles include principles of individual and collective
state jurisdiction,

^^

as sovereign equality,

disputes.

state sovereignty
^^

and

equality,

self-defense,

which together

principle of non-intervention,

^^

and

is

^"

referred to

pacific settlement of

^"*

^MOSES MASKOWITZ, THE ROOTS AND REACHES OF UN ACTIONS AND
DECISIONS 10 (1980).
*^HANS KELSEN, THE
formulas

LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS

'to inaintain (or further) international

13 (1st ed.

1950).

The

peace and security' or 'maintenance of

international peace and security' appear also in other Articles of the Charter (U.N. Charter
arts. 2(6), 11(1, 2), 43(1), 47(1), 48(1), 51, 52(1), 73(c), 84, 99,

^"U.N. Charter

"U.N.

and 106).

art. 51.

CUiarter art. 2(7).

^^U.N. Charter

art. 2(1).

^HJ.N. Charter

art. 2(7).

^'^U.N. Charter arts. 1(1), 2(3),

and

chs.

VI and XIV

of the Charter.

6

Maintenance of international peace and security corresponds to the regulation
and enforcement of the principles of international law regarding the outlawry

The League

war including other kinds of use of force and breaches of the peace.

new dimension

of Nations created a

with the emphasis

made by

to the concept of use of force

of

and since then,

the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact (1929), the

Nuremberg

Charter (1945), the United Nations Charter (1945) and several other instruments,
outlawry of war gained the force

of law.

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter declares that, "[a] 11
refrain in their international relations
territorial integrity or political

members

shall

from the threat or use of force against the

independence of any

state, or in

any other manner

inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. This principle was elaborated
as a

new

national

principle of international law in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of Inter-

Law and analyzed

systematically.

not a binding legal document,
of the peace

is

it is

much

^^

Although the Declaration

clear that resort to

a vivid violation of international law.

The

is

of itself

war or other breaches

Security Council being

entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security,

is

impliedly authorized to interpret and apply, whenever necessary, the principles of

law relating to the use of force.

The

^^

Ihiited Nations provides three pillars for the

maintenance of peace: Peaceful

change. Pacific settlement of disputes, and Collective security.

^'

Being the general

principles established by CJontemporary international law, both Pacific settlement
of disputes

and Collective security contribute

peace, and

it is

^^M. N.

to the

maintenance or restoration of

not infrequent for the Security Council to involve in these facets of

SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW

^•^U.N. Charter arts.

685-86 (3d ed. 1991).

23(1) and 24(1), and the specific powers granted to the Security

Council for the discharge of

its

duties under this responsibihty are laid

down

in

Chapters

VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
1"

WERNER

LEVI,

FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION

86 (1950).

law whilst engaged in matters pertaining to the use of force or other breaches of the
peace.

^^

Further, the Security Council

in peaceful

means, and

law, adjustment

is

required by the Charter to "bring about

conformity with the principles of justice and internal

in

i(jiial

and settlement of international disputes or situations whicli might

lead to a breach of the peace." Finally Article 14 states the duty to act in accordance

with international law and "the principle that the sovereignty of each state
to the

supremacy

of international law."

is

subject

^^

Article 24(2) of the United Nations Charter, in describing the functions of the

Security Clouncil, declares that the Security Council, in discharging

its

duties, "shall

and Principles of the United Nations." This

act in accordance with the Purposes

obligates the Security C-ouncil to conform to the principles of equal rights,

human

determination of peoples,
^^

mankind.

all

It

of states

a

it

and cultural progress of
independence

^^

marily of a political nature,
the IC.].

social

and give due regard to the principle of domestic

Although the Security Council

of

and economic,

also has to assure the territorial integrity, political

and sovereign equality
Jurisdiction.

rights

self-

it

is

required to address settlements which are pri-

does not

mean

that even

when

it

does not seek the aid

operates in isolatit)n from rules of international law

quasi-judicial

body

in

discharging

its

^^
.

.

.,

because, as

functions of dispute settlement, the Security

Council confronts numerous legal (questions, collectively concerning various principles of international law, like, the substantial rights

and duties of the

states, treaty

interpretation, etc.
I'^U.N. Charter art. 1(1).

Assembly Resolution 375(IV) of December 6, 1949.
1, paras. 2 and 3, comprising the Purposes of the United Nations.
^^U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 1, 4 and 7, comprising the Principles of the United Nations.
^'^General

"^"ILN. Charter art.

WRIGHT,
^^WESLEY

See

(1957).

tiupm note
L.

1,

at 47.

GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

569

8
resolution of international disputes and adoption of enforcement measures

Thus

])ro\'ide tJie

Security council with ample opj)ortunity to interpret and implcnicnt

almost every facet of international law.
Council

in

world society

has had an impact on

its

is

clear.

It

The

crucial

follows that the Security Council's significance

actions.

Significance of the Security Council

2.2

The United Nations
tant character.

is

importance of the Security

the international arena

in

a political body charged with the political tasks of an impor-

The General Assembly and the Security Council

organs of the United Nations.

are both principal

Nevertheless, the Security Council alone has the

])rimary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The

Security Council

is

an organ of

of China, France, Russia, the

land, aiid the United States of

its

members.

The

People's Republic

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

America are

enormous powers from the Charter
forming

fifteen

its five

to exercise

its

permanent members.
rights

functions described as 'purposes' in Article

or restoration of peace in the international

1,

community.

tion.

is

It

Ire-

derives

and discretion while per-

which are the maintenance

Dominated by the great

powers which together control most of the world's military power,
great theoretical legal power, wliich

^'^

it is

said to have

to be exercised with a high degree of discre-

24

At the time of the adoption of the U.N. Charter, there was an underlying assumption that the party states accepted

had been developed

and would abide by the international law that

in the international

community

of nation states over the pre-

^^TAE .UN KAHNG, LAW, POLITICS, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 13 (1964).
^''QUINCY WRIGHT, ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION

OF WAR

52 (I9()l).

9
vious 300 years, and that they wouhl participate in developing that law as necessary

order to achieve the purposes of the United Nations.

in

The United Nations
but

tlie

is

^^

based on the principle of sovereign equality of states,

scope of sovereignty has been so modified by obligations undertaken by the

nieinbers in ratifying the Charter that the principles of that instrument can be called

"new international law."

a

^^

Security Council has the exclusive authority to control any violation of those
principles insofar as such violation
of the peace.

amounts

Members and non-members

are

to

any threat to the peace or breach

bound by the

decisions taken by the

Security Council in order to maintain international peace and security.

Above
Charter,

is

any action

and

all, it

'^'

can be argued that perhaps the most important provisions of the

one that provides the Security Council with the general powers to take
it

security.

deems necessary

in order to

maintain or restore international peace

^^

^"•DORSEY, SupTu note
^•^WRIGHT, supra note

6, at 41.
1,

at

7.

'^"U.N. Charter art. 25.
^'^.loseph
to.

dnrnuj,

Murphy, Dt Jure W(ir in the Gulf: Lex Specialis of Chapter VII actions prior
and in the afterniatli of the United Nations War against Iraq, 5 N.Y. Int'l L.

Rev. 71. SO (1992).

Chapter

3

Theories of interpretation

Pacific settlement of disputes

3.1

Inlieieiit in

is

any international dispute or a situation that

is

likely to erupt as a dispute

the risk of danger to the world in the form of threat to the peace or breach of the

To avoid confronting

peace.

terrible consequences,

it

is

extremely important and

necessary to settle such disputes or situation by peaceful means.
of

numerous clashes

of disputes

power and

politics

between states today,

inevitable to maintain world peace, and there

is

significance in

The

of

modern

It

in

is

pacific settlement

no question that

principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, constituting an effective
is

attached substantial importance and

favored by the Charter of the United Nations, as
its

existence

its

International law has tremendously increased.

to prevent breach of the peace

and

is

With the

procedure described

in chapters

it

has been included in

means

is

strongly

its

purposes

VI and XIV.

the purpose of the United Nations "to bring about by peaceful means, and

coniorniity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or

settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of
the peace."

^

This purpose of the United Nations constitutes a function of the orga-

nization, to be carried out by the General Assembly, the Security Council,

International Court of Justice.

^

To

this function of the

Organization corresponds

an obligation of the members presented as a "principle" in Article
HJ.N. Charter

art.

and the

2,

paragraph

1(1).

^HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS
10

15 (1st ed. 1950).

3:

11

"All iiiembeis

tlard

tar as

the organization

conhned

is

means

such a

in

^

means" has no

is

concerned, the application of "peaceful means" stan-

to the settlement of only those international disputes or situations

may endanger

which

their international disputes by peaceful

that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered."

iiia.niiei

As

shrill settle

international peace and security.

definite

"*

Further, the term "peaceful

meaning. Article 33 enumerates some of them, but the

list is

not exhaustive; the General Assembly and the Security Council have power to add
to

either by the combination of existing

it,

precedents for new procedures.

The

Security Council

is

'*

pute."

'

Also,

fact likely to

if

been adopted by the states to prevent breach of
if all

the parties to any dispute so request,

to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dis-

endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

recommend appropriate procedures

recommend such terms

Up

thus plays a major role in ensuring that peaceful

the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute

decide whether to
to

It

"The Security Council may,

make recommendations

by creating

"'

of dispute settlement have

the peace.

of settlement or

entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining of inter-

national peace and security.

methods

methods

to this date, a large

of settlement as

number

it

may

or

methods

it

is

in

shall

of adjustment or

consider appropriate.

^

of international disputes or situations

have been

either brought to the attention of the Security Council or voluntarily undertaken by

the Security Clouncil for resolution.
disi)ute settlement

by a political body

But the performance
like the Security

of a judicial function of

Council has

made

crucial the

'Id.

Hl.N. Charter

art. 1(1).

'•BENTWICH

fc

MARTIN, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

''The Security Coiincil's powers and functions in this regard are

VI of the Charter.
'U.N. CUiarter

art. 38.

*U.N. Charter

art. 37(1).

12 (1969).

enumerated

in

Chapter

12
(leiuarcatioii of international disputes

recognizes
(list iiict

tlie

category of legal disputes

procedure

for

legal

and

political.

itself

disputes and has framed a

in international

the settlement of such disputes.

The Charter

'^

Legal and Political disputes

3.2

where states

In a society

as political entities,

legal constraints, strive to

as described

amidst the political pressures and the

enhance their power even

at the stake of violation of law,

common feature

of international conflicts. Thus,

the blending of law and politics

all

between

is

a

by Lauterpacht, while

"it is

not difficult to establish the proposition that

disputes between states are of a political nature, in as

or less important interests of states,

it is

much

as they involve

equally easy to show that

all

more

international

disputes are, irrespective of their gravity, disputes of a legal character in the sense
that, as the rule of law

of legal rules."

is

recognized, they are capable of an answer by the application

^'^

International law and international politics are inextricably intertwined,

^^

and

as explained

by D.W. Greig, "Law cannot exist

community

governs. In the international community, the very existence and future

it

development of its
forces

legal

framework

is

in isolation

from the needs of the

dependent upon reconciling the various

and pressures within the community."

political

^^

Despite the argument of various experts that law and politics are interrelated
to each other, the realists viewed that all international disputes are likely to be
political disputes.
conflict

^^

between states

But according
as well as

to the position taken

between private persons

U.N. Charter arts. 92, 96 and 3G, para. 3.
i"As quoted in D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL

is

by Hans Kelsen, "Any

economic or

political in

'^

^^Detlev Vagts

& Dean

LAW,

475 (1970).

N. Meiiegas, World politics and international law, 82

635 (1988).
^'^GREIG, supra note 10, at 477-78.
^^TAE .UN KAHNG, LAW POLITICS

Am.

liifl L.

AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

2 (1964).

J.

13

character; but that does not exclude the possibility of treating the dispute as a legal
dispute.

A

involved;

conflict

economic or

legal (or non-legal)

is

it

is

these interests

.

.

."

political with respect to the interests

with respect to the normative order controlling

''^

Nevertheless, the recognition based on the majority opinion
jiutes

and

macy

in international relations are

legal disputes are interrelated to a varying degree

intricate issue

is

Law

tiona]

and that law and

diplo-

^^

meaning and rationale

Speaking before the

in 1873, Professor

that political dis-

the determination of an international dispute, which

necessitates the understanding of the

international plane.

is

mutually complementary, but not that the former

exclusively serves as an instrument of the latter.

One more

which are

ot ''legal disputes"

on

meeting of the Institute of Interna-

first

Goldschmidt defined

legal disputes

between nations

as

"disputes which ought to be decided by the application of principles of law," which

included questions of territorial claims and the interpretation of treaties, but which

excluded questions of nationality, equality, or supremacy as being determined by
^''

considerations of power and therefore political.

Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice reads:

The

states parties to the present Statute

may

at

any time declare that

they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in
relation to any other state accepting the
of the

Court

same

obligation, the jurisdiction

in all legal disputes concerning:

a.

the interpretation of treaty;

b.

any question of international law;

c.

the existence of any fact which,

if

established, would con-

stituted a breach of an international obligation;
d.

the nature or extent of the reparation to be

made

for the

breach of an international obligation.
i-^M at

i.

^^Opinion of Laiiteipacht, Lincoln
yapvd note 13, at

i"M

at 8.

3.

P.

Bloomfield and Myres

McDougal

cited in

KAHNG,

14

As

concerned, any dispute which

far as the general definition of legal disputes is

one or more of these four classes of disputes

falls in

"But the term

"legal"

is

is

by definition

"legal."

not confined to these connotations. As pointed out by

Lauterpacht, "legal" encompasses the following:

Does

refer to disputes

it

which are capable of a solution by the apj>lication
Or to disputes of minor impor-

of an existing rule of international law?

tance as distinguished from political disputes involving grave issues? Or
to disputes to

form of a

which the

application of legal rules

and the progress

forward

plaintiff state puts

legal proposition?
is

Or does

it

its

demand

refer to disputes in

compatible with justice

likely to yield results

of international relations?

The term

has to be noted that a dispute

international law,

if it

is

^^

^^

clearly not legal

though

it

may be

not centered upon the legal "position" (which

tested by the parties) but

disregarded.

is

upon whether

"Although interpretation

been

"legal" has

applied in the last thirty years in each of these meanings."

It

the

in

which the

is

"about"
not con-

or not that position should be altered or
of a treaty

is

prima

facie a function within

the competence of an international tribunal, the terms of the particular treaty
raise

matters regarding political rather than legal judgments".

The

International Court of Justice, in handling the issue of

its

may

^^

power

to adjudicate

an international dispute, applied a similar principle and pronounced that

if

a question

referred to the Court which cannot be resolved by applying legal criteria, then

is

unless
its

it

has been asked to give a decision ex aequo

incompetence.

which

is

is

^^

It

and answering a

t<upra

^"WILLIAM

SYSTEM

E.

legal question in the light of

was pointed out by the International Court of Justice

^'"British Reservations to the Optional Clause," 10

^^GREIC,

must declare

a fundamental diflFerence between answering a ques-

essentially political,

political factors.

bono, the Court

^^

At the same time, there
tion

et

in

Economica 162 (1930).

note 10, at 476.

BUTLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL

172 (1987).

^^GREIG, supra note

10, at 477.

its

early advisory opinions concerning the interpretation of the Charter that wliat-

ever the background or political implications of a case be,
international law, the Court can give a decision.
It

if it

raises a question of

^^

therefore follows that irrespective of the interplay of law and politics, the

viiiderlying issue involved in
fact, requiring resolution

the case

may

an international dispute

is

either a question of law or

by application of legal principles or by political means as

be.

Exemplifying this principle. The Permanent Court of International Justice,
the

Mavrommatis

case provided that, "a dispute

is

in

a disagreement on a point of

law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons.

^^

The

disputes handled by the Security Council are no exception to this and are centered

upon either a

legal or political question.

U.N. Charter interpretation

3.3

According to Article 36(3) of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council,

mending appropriate procedures
disi)utes

brought to

its

or

methods

in

recom-

of peaceful settlement of international

attention, "should also take into consideration that legal

disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to International Court
of .lustice."

Throughout the history

of the Security Council only rarely

formal procedures of handling legal cjuestions been followed.
the Security Council has dealt on
It

its

own both

is

more

like a constitution

This evidences that

political as well as legal questions.

has been argued that the United Nations

the Charter

^'*

have these

is

a "living" institution and that

than an ordinary treaty.

'^^

The Charter

'^^C'ompetence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United

Nations, 1950

I.C..J.

"P.C.I..J. (sei.

Rep. 3 at

A) No.

'^''KAHNG, nuimi note

'^••CHARTER

13.

2, at 11.

13, at

.5.

AND LIVING LAW

160.
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sets iortli the objectives, purposes, principles of the Organization,

vvliicli

powers and functions of the organs, has made obhgatory

for

and the

the Security Council to

"bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations

which might lead to a breach of the peace."

"We

says:

^'^

Further, the Preamble of the ("barter

the peoples of the United Nations determined

under which justice and respect

...

for the obligations arising

to establish conditions

from treaties and other

sources of international law can be maintained."

The
1

(J

t

Security C'ouncil

lie priiicii)les

is

therefore under a constraint to give primary consideration

of international law

when confronted with a

legal question.

However,

the U.N. ("barter and the general international law include principles of justice as well
as rules of order,

^'

and the

rules concerning recognition, aggression,

disarmament,

and military necessity are therefore the primary concern of the international order.
These principles are
in the

law.

also

known

as principles of

new

^^

international law. Characterized

Charter are also the basic principles of law or the customary international

'''

Thus

in

majority of the cases where interpretation of international law

is

recjuired,

the interpretation of the ('barter would suffice, because the Charter itself

is

an

eml)odiment of the principles of international law, and as pointed out by Quincy
Wright, law emerges from the interpretation and application of those principles
contained in the Charter.
^'^Tliis

'^"

ol)hgatiou, described in U.N. Charter art.

1,

para.

1, is

imposed upon

all

the

organs of the organization.

^"QUINCY WRIGHT, ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION

OF WAR
^'^See

15 (1961).

supra

p. 5.

^^See supra p. 5 and text accompanying notes 10-14.

3«QUINCY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS
(1960).
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There

is

opinion amongst the scholars of international law as to the

a division of

nature of the United Nations Charter.

Whether

treaty or as a constitution.

ment
have

or a special treaty,
set

it is

has been viewed either as a multilateral

called a constitution, a constituent instru-

has been argued that the following features of the Charter

it

apart not only from bilateral treaties, but from other multilateral treaties

it

as well:

It

In the hrst place,

it

is

a constituent instrument defining the structure of

the Organization and setting forth the powers and functions of
rights

and duties of

members. Second,

its

it

organs and the

its

was intended to endure not just

for the

present, or for the foreseeable future, but for "succeeding generations." Third
sui)erior to all other treaties as a "higher law" (Art 103

states that participated in
It

drafting are far out

2(6)).

And

is

fourth, the

numbered by new members.

^^

has been remarked by Samuel Sliih and Tsaichen, that "The problem of con-

stitutional interijretation

How

(2)

its

and

it

to interpret?

Though

is

two- fold: (1)

Who

has the authority to interpret? and

'^'^

interpretation has been the principal

method by which the Charter has

been adapted to new conditions, answers to these basic questions are not specifically
provided for in the Charter

Answer
l)y

to the

question,

first

'^^

"who has the authority

to interpret?"

is

kept open

the San Francisco Conference, leaving each organ of the United Nations to inter-

[)ret itself

the relevant parts of the Charter with the hope that their interpretation

will receive general

is

itself.

support and

commonly perceived

or even the
^^

members

make

the United Nations a living institution.

'^'^

It

that the Charter leaves the door wide open for any organ,

individually to interpret

it.

Since the Charter

Blaine Sloan, The Unittd Nations Charter as a Constitution,

1

is

not a model

Pace Y.B.

Int'l L. 61,

ll(i-li7 (1989).

"SAMUEL SHIH & TSAICHEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 78 (1973).
"LELAND M. GOODRICH, THE UN
^''SHIH

fc

TSAICHEN,

supra note 32.

IN

A CHANGING WORLD

(1974).
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ut

precise (liatting, the pioiuse ambiguities

\vi(l<'

and even inconsistencies make possible

divergencies of interpretation and development.

Concerning the precept of interpretation,

it

'^^

has been pointed out that the spe-

features of the ('barter preeminently warrant the application of the points

cial

relating both to treat.y interpretation

and to constitutional construction:

evolu-

tionary development, subsec|uent practice, structural interpretation and effectiveness.

^*'

Professor Oscar Schachter, as early as 1951, applied the theory of evo-

lutionary development, and stated:

"it

[the Charter]

is

a constitutional instrument

whose broad phrases were designed to meet changing circumstances
future.

Any doubt

as to the flexibility

II.

N. Charter has proved

an undefined

and adaptability of the Charter must surely

have been resolved by recent developments."
domestic jurisdiction, self-defense,

for

'^'

Interpretation of the principles of

etc., are glorious

itself sufficiently flexible to

examples

illustrating that the

adapt to new situations.

Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on treaties states the approach to interpretation, "in the light of its object

and purpose."

"^^

Such an interpretation

is

perfectly

applicable to the Charter because the broad and sweeping language of the Preamble

and of Article

1

on the purposes of the United Nations manifests nothing but the

object and purpose.

In the words of

Quincy Wright, "Even

tional clauses appear precise in their terms, the symbolic

assertions of purposes

in

their apparent

meaning."

some

of the opera-

preamble and the broad

and principles provide ample opportunity

complementing or modifying

The

if

for

supplementing,

"^^

structural interpretation remains in the background waiting to play

its role

the proper time and circumstances, although the International Court, in inter-

^'"WRIGHT, supia note
^''

30, at 33.

Sloan, supra note 31, at 117.

^'Book Review. GO Yale

THE UNITED NATIONS
'^^Scf

L.J. 189, 193 (1951), reviewing H.

(1966).

Haldeninian, Lc(jal Basis

^"^WRIGHT, supra note

KELSEN, THE LAW OF

fo?-

30, at 33.

United Nations Forces, 56 A.J.I.L. 971 (1962).
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Charter" and "the relations

pretirig the Charter, has referred to "the structure of the

estahHshed by

The

it

between the General Assembly and the Security Council."

"principle of effectiveness" would give priority to achieving the

''"

major pur'^^

poses of the Organization and subordinating restrictive provisions of the Charter.

Lit)Pral or effective interpretation', which gives weight to the purposes of the orga-

nization,

and which permits any organ to act when necessary and proper to carry

out the purposes of the charter unless explicitly forbidden or unless the proposed
action

is

clearly contrary to the general intentions of the instrument.

'^^

In support of the theory of 'liberal interpretation', the International

Justice, in the Certain

Expenses

case, expressed the

view that, [W]hen the orga-

nization takes action which warrants the assertion that
fulfillment of

Court of

it

was appropriate

for the

one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption

that such action

is

'^^

not "ultra vires" the Organization.

Another category known

as 'restrictive interpretation' has also

been recognized,

which assumes that states have not parted with their sovereignty or limited
exercise unless they have agreed to do so expressly
the- princijjle

a

of 'restrictive interpretation' are

and

more

is

explicitly.

its

Those who espouse

inclined to view the Charter as

treaty to be interpreted with the recognized i)rinciples of treaty interpretation.

Interpretation tlnougli practice, which

is

a ])rocedure allowing flexibility

organic growth (Article 31(3)(b) of Vienna Convention)
for

documents

like the Charter,

whether we

Sloan, supra note 31.
Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law,

call

it

is

'^'^

and

particularly appropriate

a constitution, a constituent

'^".S'ee
"^^

'^HVRIGHT, supra note

30, at 38. See

S>^

^^Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. 157.

United Nations to

luring a

Am.

.J.

Int'l L. 1

GOODRICH,
Also, in

(1994).

supra note 33, at 36.
its

opinion on the capacity of the

claim for damages suffered by an

official

of the Organization,

stated that, "[T]he organization must be
expressly provided in
essential to the

it

deemed to have those powers which, though not
the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary imphcation as being

performance of

^'^GOODRICH, Supra note

its

duties." See

33, at 36.

GOODRICH,

supra note 33, at 37.
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''^

iiistniiiieut or a spefial treaty sui generis.

For example, Article 22 of the U.N.

Charter autliorizing the General Assembly to establish such
it

deems necessary

for the

performance of

functions.

its

sul)si(liary

organs as

Instead of interi)reting

it

narrowly to refer only to committees and commissions set up to assist the Assembly

through studies and advice,

has been broadly interpreted to permit the estab-

it

lishment of a great variety of operational agencies including peace keeping forces,

and other organs needed to meet particular

aid missions, an environmental agency

exigencies.
\'()te

An

''^'

often cited

example

interpreted expansively of nine

the permanent

members"

Article 27(3) requires the affirmative

is.

members

for decisions

on

tice quickly established that abstentions

all

including "the concurring votes of

matters other than procedure. Prac-

would not be considered vetoes.

'^^

Peace

Keeping operations, developed by the General Assembly and subsequently followed
by the Security Council

another example.

is

between peaceful settlement
l)ut finds

m

'^^

Peace keeping

falls

Chapter VI and Enforcement Action

no precise authorization

in the Charter.

tices are variously considered either a

'''^

in

somewhere

Chapter VII,

These firmly established prac-

broad interpretation or informal amendment

through practice.

common

Although the

values which the Charter sets forth are stated in very

general terms and their generality permits

much

latitude in their interpretation,

the organs oi the United Natjons, generally speaking, do not have the authority to
interpret and apply these jninciples in any conclusive manner. ^°

Since the responsibility for interpretation
the process
'*'

is

more

likely to

^' Id. at 120-121.

at 121.

^''Id.

^"GOODRICH,

vested in organs and

be political than judicial.

Sloan, supra note 31, at 120.

'^^Id.

is

supra note 33, at 29.

The

members

alike,

task faced by most

21

U.N. bodies

is j)iart.ica.l

reroinnuMid state

regards

it

in the

iiiil>licit

is,

^^

A

achieve a goal.

l)eliavioi to

cases, takes the action

that

and iustrumerital-that

its

deemed expedient

in

to prepare a plan of action or to
political body, in

majority of the

the circumstances, thereby indicating

action as in accord with the Charter,

^^

and, interpretation

is

measures adopted, which are centered largely on the relation between

means and ends

in

^^

the specific contexts.

There are important exceptions, however, where interpretation of a more exphcit
adjudicative character related mainly to the U.N. Charter provisions and to

major

treaties

is

involved.

^'^

The vagueness and ambiguity

lead to multiple contradicting perceptions thereby

complex and debatable. This

states

under the Charter and general international law

intervention, self-determination,

is

of interpre-

especially true regarding the obligations of

human

rights,

independence, threats to the peace, and equality.
It is

of the Charter provisions

making the process

tation

some

in regard to the use of force,

and the principles of sovereignty,
^^

constructive, with respect to the issues of this thesis to analyze

how few

of

the important provisions of international law enumerated in the Charter which were
severely contested were interpreted by the Security Council during the years of
practice.

'^Schachter, supra note 4i, at

"WRIGHT,

''^Schachter, supra note 41,

'-'Id.

at 7.

6.

supra note 30, at 37.
a.t

6.

its

Chapter 4

The Security Council's approach to the interpretation of Charter
LAW

Article 2(4) of the Charter

4.1

Article 2(4) states that:
"All

Members

from the threat
integrity or political independence

shall refrain in their international relations

or use of force against the territorial
of any state, or in any other

manner

inconsistent with the purposes of

the United Nations."

Article 2(4)

is

one of the few provisions of the Charter that stands significant

and distinct from the others, and that has a greater impact on the
aspects of the behavior of states.

It

political

and

legal

implicitly reiterates the objective of the United

Nations- 'maintenance of peace and security,' by imposing a negative obligation on
the

member

states,

which

is

to refrain

from threat or use of

force. It

Focuses on an

important concept of international law-the threat or use of force, and accordingly
sets lorth the duties of the

A

members.

i)roper interpretation of Article 2(4)

Article 39. Article 2(4)

would necessitate a careful reading

and Article 39 go hand

in

hand, and therefore, ought to be

read simultaneously. Thus in the joint opinion of Anthony
Vagts,

"

To

That

is

D'Amato and Detlev

F.

from Chapter VII would be to ignore the

'apply' Article 2(4)in isolation

other side of the coin.

of

not to say that Article 2(4) would be meaningless

22

23
111

the absence of Security Council enforcement action; rather,

is

must be

carefully

^

interpreted''.

This

it

certainly true because, Article 2(4) does not only prohibit the threat or

use of force to achieve political objectives, but also prohibits the use of force in

any other manner inconsistent with the with the purposes of the United Nations.

The determination

as to

whether any threat or use of force

l)urposes of the United Nations (which

is

is

inconsistent with the

primarily to maintain international peace

and security by prevention and removal of the threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace and acts of aggression),
.\rticle 39 of the
(

is

made by

the Security Council, as

empowered by

Charter.

'areful scrutiny reveals that

it

does not outlaw

all

transboundary uses of military

force, but only those directed against a nation's territorial integrity or political inde-

pendence.

A

'"humanitarian intervention" that does not annex any portion of the

target state arguably

capability

is

is

allowed by Article 2(4)

if

the Security Council's enforcement

prevented by the veto. Thus, since 1945 there have been several suc-

cessful unilateral

such as India

in

humanitarian interventions arguably creating new customary law,

Bangladesh (1971), Tanzania

Africa (1979), and the United States in

in

Uganda

(1979), France in Central

Grenada (1983) and Panama

(1989).

According to the text and the drafters' intent. Article 2(4) does not cover internal
use ol lorce, such as civil strife, revolutions, etc., and in a corresponding construction,

the terms "breach of the peace," "act of aggression," and "threat to the peace," as

used

ill

Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, have been interpreted to relate to the inter-

national use or threat of use of military force.

^Anthony D'Amato and Detlev
uae of force, 85
"^.Jost

Am.

Dell)ruck,

.J.

Int'l L.

A more

F. Vagts, Right

In all but

^

v.

two

cases, the Council

Might: International law and the

201, 202 (1991).

effective international law or a

new "World Law"'^-Sonie

Aspects of the development of international law in a changing international system, 68
lud. L..T. 705, 708 (1993).
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adliered to a narrow reading of both Article 2(4)

lias

lowing instances, however,

in

the post-Cold

War

and Article

39.

era, manifests that the

^

The

Coun(

fol-

il.

in

fnrtheranc e of the object and ])nrposes of the United Nations, laid a strong fonndation for the

emerging

principles of the

The
in

two

i)rinciijles of

international law by not merely reinterpreting the

Articles, bnt also

by taking effective enforcement measures.

Council's determination that the consequences of the repression of the Kurds

Iraq by the Iraqi government during the

wake

of the recent Gulf

War, "threaten

international peace and security" substantively corresponds to Article 39, which

empowers the Security Council

to determine

whether there exists "a threat

breach of the peace or an act of aggression."

'^

It

is

to or

evident from the text of the

resolution that the C'ouncil found that an internal situation-the forcible repression
of minorities in Iraci- constituted a threat to international peace
of

it

''consequences," that

is, its

and security because

potential escalation into an international conflict.

^

Less than half a year later, the Security Council confronted the growing violence
in

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where the constituent republics of Slovenia and

Croatia set out to secede from the Federation.

danger of neighboring states becoming involved

*^

Although there was no immediate

in the military conflict, the Security

Council did not hesitate in classifying the situation as a "threat to international

peace and security."
Also,

when

were received

reports of massive air raids on the Shiite minority in southern Iraq

in early fall 1992,

although by inference rather than express decision

taken, the violence within Iraq was the starting point for an interventionist activity

within the framework of a Security Council decision.

^M

a,t

"^Id.

at 708-709.

^

70S.

\S.C. Res. 688, U.N.

SCOR,

46th

''Delbruck, supra note 2, at 709.
'Id. at 710.

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 (1991).
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Subsequently, in the cases of Somalia and Haiti, the Security Council characterized the internal conflict as a threat to international peace

enforcement measures.

'^

These instances indicate that the Council

construe Article 39 more broadly than

now

force, that

prepared to

of Article 2(4),

is,

to internal as well as international use of force,

use of force at least potentially, or with

is

\'I1

was originally envisaged and applied. The

it

enforcement of the i)rohibition of the use of
to extend

and took Chapter

some reasonable

where

seems also

this internal

probability, constitutes a

threat to international peace and security and/or results in massive

human

rights

violations.

The Charter

recognizes three major exceptions to the use of

the meaning of Article 2(4):

'*

The

first is

armed

force within

provided by Article 51, which preserves for

states "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense," thereby permitting

the states to exercise this right "until the security Council has taken the measures

necessary to maintain international peace and security."

The second exception

to

Article 2(4) arises once the Security C'ouncil takes the "necessary measures." Hence,

once the Security Council takes the "necessary measures" which transform an action
of sell-defense into

an enforcement action,

member

states

have a duty to

assist in the

enforcement action and to refrain from assisting the aggressor (Art 2(5)). The mech-

anism
of

for facilitating this

Chapter VH. But

this

concluded between the

transformation

mechanism

member

is

states

is

contained in the enforcement provisions

dependent on the special agreements being

and the United Nations. Until

this

happens,

a transitional security arrangement under Article 106 operates. This agreement provides the third major exception to Article 2(4): a joint action by the five

members
*"

of the Security Covmcil on behalf of the

permanent

United Nations.

See infra notes 32 and 3G.

three exceptions are discussed in Derek Gilnian, The Gulf War and the United
Nations Charter: Did the Security Council fulfill its original mission, 24 Conn. L. Rev.
'''The

1131, 1135 (1992).

2G

A

few more exceptions could be identified by a careful scrutiny of Article 2(4).

As has been interpreted by one school

of thought,

it

is

a conditional qualified ban

on the use of force, because, the closing words of Article 2(4), prohibiting the use of
force in any aspect contrary to the purposes of the United Nations Charter,

when

read in conjunction with the lunnan rights provisions throughout the Charter (Arts
1(3), 13(1 )(b), 55(c), 02(2) ()8(2)), lend further

credence to this proposition-they are

regarded as supporting a contextual reading of the proscription of the use of force,
balancing the latter against the protection of

Thus, force used

for i)ur})oses consistent

such as intervention to uphold

human

human

rights.

with the

rights,

is

^"

the United Nations,

spirit of

arguably allowed by Article 2(4),

and since 1945 there have been several successful unilateral humanitarian interventions arguably creating

Tanzania
in

in

Uganda

law, such as India in Bangladesh (1971),

(1979), France in Central Africa (1979),

Grena.da(1983) and

4.2

new customary

Panama

(1989).

and the United States

^^

Article 2(7) of the Charter

Non-intervention

is

a fundamental principle of International law based

Sovereignty, equality, and the political independence of states.

^^

upon the

This obligation

extends to both states and international organizations. The founders of the United

Nations incorporated the doctrine of non-intervention in Art 2(7) of the U.N. Charter

which reads:

"Nothing contained

in

the present Charter shall authorize the United

Nations to intervene

in

matters which are essentially within the domestic

jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
^"^.Tudy

See supra

^'^Rutli

to

submit such

A. Gallant, HunianituTian Intervention and Security Council Resolution 688:

reappraisal in light of a chantjincj world order, 7
^^

Members

p.

U.

J. Int'l k.

A

Pol'y 881, 888 (1992).

12 and note 11.

Gordon, United Nations Intervention

Bexjond, 15 Mich.

Am.

J. Int'l L.

519, 520 (1994).

in internal conflicts:

Iraq,

Somalia, and

27
matters to

settleiiiciit

under the

j:)resent

Charter; but this principle

sliall

not prejudice the apphcation of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII."

This ])rovision has also been extensively criticized as vague and ambiguous, and
therefore susceptible to multiple interpretations.

A

was incorporated
it is

^'^

''broad" interpretation of the provision has led to contentions that,
in the

Charter

in Article 2 as

(1)

it

one of the Principles; Consequently,

a rule rather than an exception in the operation of the United Nations. (2) the

exclusion of the reference to ''international law" at San Francisco Conference implied
the competence of a nation to determine whether a matter was within the domestic
jurisdiction of that State. (3) the

which includes

all

term "intervene"

is

a broad term the meaning of

measures of intervention, dictatorial or otherwise.

(4)

the use of

the term "essentially" in place of "solely" increased the reserved domain, for

some

matters which are not solely within the domestic jurisdiction "such as the questions
of nationality

would

still

be essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"; and

(5) the

insertion of words "enforcement measures" further prevented the Organization from

intervening in domestic matters even under Chapter VII of the Charter,

if

proposed

action were in the nature of provisional measures under Article 40 of the Charter.

However, a "narrow" interpretation of the paragraph has provided that,
"discussion" of a question does not constitute an intervention; the

recommendations
vidual states

if

of general character

the C'harter; (3) there
i^SVc

TAE

^•^Id.

at 29.

is

(1)

true of

specifically addressed to indi-

they are not calculated to exercise direct pressure; (2) the principle

of dcjmestic jurisdiction should

1904).

and even those

same

^"^

.UN

is

be balanced by other equally important principles of

no substantial

legal,

much

less practical, difference

between

KAHNG, LAW, POLITICS, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
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the terms "essentially" and "solely"; (4) the absence of a provision for the determi-

nation of whether a matter

is

essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state

does not warrant auto interpretation by that state; and (5) the cjuestion

may be

answered by an impartial finding of the competent non-judicial organs of the United
Nations.

Because of these many ambiguities, caution must be exercised
(louncil in interpreting Article 2(7), so that a reasonable balance

between the interest of the Security Council

in the

b}'

the Security

may be

ensured

maintenance of international

peace and security and the interest of sovereign nations in the exclusive control over

matters falling within their domestic jurisdiction.

^^

Article 2(7), which proclaims the principle of non-intervention, provides in itself

an exception to

it:

"but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforce-

ment measures under Chapter VII".

In order for the

U.N. to adopt enforcement

measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council must find that
the controversy: (1) does not
state,

and

power

to

lie

"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the

(2) constitutes a threat to international

peace and security,

^*'

and the

determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or

act of aggression vests with the Security Council.

While the phrase
the Charter,

^'

"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"

when new developments

in a state

become a matter

is

undefined by

of international

concern, they loses their status as a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the
state.
^^Id. at 31.

^'^David

M. Kresock,

''Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans:

intervention, 27 Coniell Int'l L.J. 203, 209-210 (1994).
^"

U.N. Charter

art. 39, ch. VII.

The

legal foundations of foreign

29
Thus, Article 2(7)

is

when the Security Council

inapplicable not only

sures pursuant to C!hapter VII of the Charter, but also

when

a matter

is

takes mea-

not essen-

within the domestic jurisdiction of the state.

tially

As

early as 1946, Dr.

Evatt,

make

the Security Council "to

Chairman

of the

further studies in order to determine whether the

situation in Spain has led to international friction

peace and security, and
the United Nations

may

if it

Sub-Committee established by

and does endanger international

what practical measures

so finds, then to determine

take," explained this point in terms of the relation

between

Article 2(7) and Chapter VII of the Charter as follows:
"...it

should be pointed out quite clearly that Article

2,

Paragraph

7,

of

the Charter does not say that the United Nations shall not intervene in

any matter which does not

fall

within Chapter VI.

What

it

does say

is

that the United Nations shall not intervene in a matter essentially within

the domestic jurisdiction of state.

When

considering this point

we can

Chapter VII. We should concern ourselves only with the
terms of Article 2, Paragraph 7, and ask ourselves whether or not this
question is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Spain. That is
a cpiestion of fact. It depends upon the circumstances of the particular
forget about

case.

What

are the facts?

The

facts are that there

is

a situation the

continuance of which, in the finding of the Sub- Committee,

is

endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

The

likely to
^*

Security Council has frequently recognized that domestic disputes often

carry international implications,
of international peace

What

and

^'*

security.

and

in

many

^°

constitutes a "threat to the peace"

the Security Council
to the peace.

^^

is

cases ripen into a potential threat

is

undefined by the Charter.

^^

Instead,

vested with broad discretionary power in determining a threat

Nevertheless, lack of precision and clarity of the term "threat to

^'^KAHNG, supra note 13, at 34.
^'*Marc M. Boutin, Somalia: The

lajality of

U.N. forcible humanitarian intervention, 17

Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 138, 154 (1994).

^^Appropriate examples are the recent cases of Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somaha, and Haiti.

Gordon, supra note 12, at 563
'^m.N. Charter art. 39, ch. VII.
^^
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the
fi

i)efi(-e"

has created

iiiaiiy

problems of interpretation. However,

threat to the peace, the Security Council has acted

vvitli

in deteniiiuing

due regard to factual

hu(Hugs, interpretations of Charter provision, and the weighing of political consid-

employed are not

erations; the concept
Iraq, Somalia,

in

and Bosnia-Herzegovina, have introduced a new concept of a

selective,

approach to global security, and a redefinition of the concept of sovereignty

collective

and have

solely legal in nature. ^^ Its recent actions in

also launched collective security missions.

^'^

Each case

is

discussed in detail

order to gain a good grasp of the reasoning behind the Security Council's actions.
After the end of Gulf War, Iraqi Kurds began a rebellion against the

Baghdad

government, wanting the anti-Iraq coalition to liberate them, along with Kuwait,

from Sadda.m Hussein's Government.

^^

ment

Kurds

Iran.

forces
^^'

prompted

Despite

inactive for

large

numbers

of

The

fierce military

to attempt to flee Iraq for

some time because

rights abuses

intervention.
tries tliat

^'

Turkey and

massive liuman rights violation, the Security Council remained

tlie

of the prohibition by Article 2(7) of the Charter of

direct intervention in the domestic affairs of the

human

onslaught by govern-

member

states,

and apparently, the

were not enough to make this an international issue warranting

Rather

it

was the massive movement of people to neighboring coun-

took the matter out of Iraq's internal

affairs

and made the Security Council

action by passing of Resolution 688, wherein the Security Council found for the

first

time, that massive displacement of refugees constituted a threat to international
"^'^Gordon, supra note 12, at 5()3-564.
''''

Captain Gregory

P. Harjjer,

Creating a U.N. peace enforcement force:

i8-SPG Fletcher F. World Aff. 49, 50 (1994).
"'Mary EUen O'ConixeU, Continuincj limits on U.N. intervention

A

case for

US

kndr.r.slnp,

L..T.

in civil war, 67 Ind.

903, 904 (1992).

''''Gordon, supra note 12, at 546-547.

d(

^'

Id.

t(

rm/.natron prevails over political manipulation, 22 Denv.

(1994).

Sec Gregory

J.

Ewald, The Kurds' right

to secede

mider international law:
J. Int'l L.

&

Self-

Pol'y 375, 405
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peace and security.

^^

Security ('ouncil in a

The ultimate passage

civil conflict

al)sence of (Jhapter VII measures,

The

its

is

a

new and important development.

in

the

^'^

between the province of Croatia, which

independence, and the Yugoslav federal government also raised the

U.N. intervention

(luestion of

which involved the

without the consent of the state involved,

ftghting that broke out in Yugoslavia

had declared

of Resolution 688

in civil war.

^°

Although there was no cross-border

activity in this case, the Security Council disregarded the domestic jurisdiction principle

and declared that the communist problem

states that the threat to the peace

is

is

so associated with neighboring

international,

and

justified the intervention

and application of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.

The U.N. took

a substantial step forward in late 1992

when the

Security Council

authorized humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and the Security Council, for the

human

first

time, equated massive

The

horrific situation in Somalia, characterized

al)uses in that the population

supplies,

human

tragedy with a threat to international peace.

human rights

was denied access to food, medicine, and other

undoubtedly made the situation of international concern.

^^

was severe and massive.

the U.N. Charter neither precluded nor

Ira.qi

"The Security

U.N.

SCOR,

....

civihan population in

many

under

In this factual situation,

mandated humanitarian

Coinicil

^^Boutiii, 6?//m/,note 19. See S.C. Res. 688,

(1991), which states that,

'^'^

relief

Although the

rights violations did not pose a viable threat to international peace

traditional views, the suffering

the

by anarchy and massive

intervention.

."
.

.

.

^''^Gordon, supra uote 12, at 549.

^"OX-onneU, supra uote 25,
^^

^^Gordon, supia note
'^'^

at 909.

Boutin, supra note 19, at 155.
12, at 551.

Boutin, supra note 19, at 163.

'^'^

46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/47
1.

Condemns

the repression of

parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish

populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security
the region

'^^

in

32

The

Security Council balanced the desperate need lor humanitarian intervention

with political concerns.
Haiti

^^

another instance where the Security Council took a startling step by

is

intervening in the internal conflict of Haiti, in the rationale of "threat" to the peace,
despite the fact that the Haitian regime was no threat to

its

neighbors, no military or

any other kind of intervention was contemplated, and that the
were not as serious as those

While

Somalia.

its efforts

These instances

may

and Haiti

raise

profound

parameters of the term, "threat to the peace," making later

more problematic.

actions by the Security Council

'^'

clearly depict that, even an essentially domestic conflict, such as

threaten the stability of the international

a threat to the peace.

4.3

^"^

to deal with the problems in Somalia

(juestions regarding the

civil strife,

rights abuses

intervention in Iraq and Yugoslavia are justified by the provisions of

its

the (Charter,

in

human

community and

constitute

"^'^

Article 39

The crux

of the enforcement

(

because

'barter,

it

mechanism

in the

makes the very existence

U.N. system exists

or non-existence of

peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression dependent

made by

the Security Council in this regard.

"The Security Council

in Article 39 of the

It

any threat to the

upon the determination

provides that:

Shall determine the existence of any threat to

the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."
'''Id.

^'Kiordon, supra note 12, at 573.

^^M
'^'^

at 546.

Gallant, supra note 10, at 906.

X]

The terms
not

l)»-eii

the peace,' 'breach of the peace,' and 'act of aggression' have

'iJireat to

defined by

tiic

|)ower in determining

(

'barter.

This gives the Security Council a wide discretionary

what constitutes a

or an 'act of aggression.'

'threat to the peace,' a 'breach of the peace,'

Even though from the point

39, a 'breach of the peace' exists

of view of the context of Article

whenever hostihties occur between armed

forces

controlled by governments, de facto or de jure, at opposite sides of an internationally

recognized frontier, and a 'threat to the peace occurs when, because of a declaration

by the government of a state against

of war, of intervention, or of other hostile intent

another state.

'^'^

inter])reta.tions of

the Security Council, acting with due regard to factual findings,

Charter provision, and the weighing of political considerations,

has gone far beyond this to

accommodate

"*"

various acts within the undefined terms

including those that have not been envisioned by the Charter. For example, in the
rases concerning Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia

and

Haiti, the

magnitude of

civil strife

within the state was considered an immediate danger of a breach of international
peace.

During the period of Culf War, Iraq deliberately pumped
ignited oil well

fires.

Irac^'s

deliberate

to a release of a harmful substance

pumping

of oil into the

oil

into the Gvdf

Gulf certainly amounts

from a land-based source, and also constitutes

pollution from an installation operating in the marine environment.

Although the Security Council did not

damage constituted

and

specifically declare that the

'^^

environmental

a "breach of the peace," from a practical perspective, however,

the Seciuity Council had already characterized Iraq's invasion as a "breach of the

peace" and hence there was no need to further characterize individual acts in such

^'-^QUINCY

WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS

93-95

(i9()0).
'*".SVr

supra pp. 31-33.

''^Autliony Leibler,

Deliberate

internatronal law, 23 Cal.

W.

Wartime Environmental damage:

Int'l L.J. 67,

130 (1992).

New

Challenges for

34
"^^

terms.

The

Security ('ouiicil

l)y

Resolution 687 imposed liability

its

an

for

unUiwltil use of force, acknowledging expressly that the unlawful use of force included

environmental damage.

The hnding

'*'*

that the deliberate sabotage

b}^

Iraq constituted 'use of force,'

is

one other instance that exemplifies the Security Council's adoption of elaborate
interpretation.

Article 51 of the Charter

4.4

The inadequate statutory
disagreement,

'*'*

as to the

drafting of Article 51 has predictably led to substantial

meanings

of the

words and phrases

in the Article.

Article 51 not only revolves around the principle of the legitimate use of force

through

self defense,

but also couples the rights of states with the function of the

In view of the language of this Article, clarity of interpretation

Security Council.

of especially this Article

is

crucial.

inter]uet to their advantage,
essential

paradigm

for

and chaos

will result.

"Because the Charter

is

the

determining the legality of actions taken by international

actors, its lack of precision

The

Otherwise, whoever interprets Article 51 will

and multiple interpretations cannot be tolerated."

^^

text of Article 51 provides:

"Nothing

in

the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of

individual or collective self-defense

Member of

if

an armed attack occurs against a

the United Nations until the Security Council has taken mea-

sures necessary to maintain international peace and security measures

Paragraph Hi of the S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/R.es/687
(1991), expressly "re-affirms that Iraq ... is hable under INTERNATIONAL LAW
lor any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and depletion of natural
resources ... as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait."
'^'^Wallace F. Warriner, The unilateral use of coercion under International law: A legal
-i'^

anahjf^is o/ the

United States raid on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37 Naval L. Rev.

49, 52

(1988).
''•''Tlioma.s

(1992).

K. Plofchan, Article 51: Limits on self-defense, 13 Mich.

J. Int'l L.

336, 344
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taken by

Members

in

the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be

immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The Charter

recognizes Article 51 as an exception to Article 2(4), whereby, the

states are authorized to exercise their inherent right of individual or collective self

defense.

But such

a riglit is

not unlimited.

It

was the intent of the drafters

of the

Charter that the self-defensive action be permitted only "before the machinery of
the Organization [could] be brought into action," and this intent to permit a very

limited

riglit

of self-defense

is

evident in (1) the overall purpose of the Charter, (2)

the purpose of Article 51, and (3) the evolution of the text of the article at the San
'^^

Francisco Conference.

The

text of Article 51 dictates that the right of self-defense

is

limited and cannot

be exercised after the Security Council takes the "measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."

The phrase

"until the Securit}' Council has taken

measures necessary to maintain international peace and security"
is

open

to

numerous

interpretations.

is

'*'

Since the Charter does not explicitly define "measures necessary,"

what point Article 51
is

very vague and

limits a nation's right of self-defense. If

it is

not clear at

"measures necessary"

interpreted expansively to include even the call for a Security Council meeting to

discuss a conflict, then a nation's right of self-defense would be cut off quickly.

At the other extreme,

if

"measures necessary"

is

read to

mean

'^^

only Security Council

actions which actually end a conflict, then a nation would have a virtually unlimited
right to take

independent action at any time during a

'^^'Kathryn S. Elliott,

The

New

luitrons charter, 15 Hastings Int'l
^'

^''Id.

4(i,

at 68.

'^^

world order and the right of self-defense in the united
L. Rev. 55, 69 (1991).

& Comp.

Plofchaii, supra note 45, at 339-340.

'^^Elhott, supra note

conflict.
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Thus, based on the interpretation that self-defense action
Security Council takes action,

allowed until the

is

Article 51 was applied to the situation of Iraq's

if

armed attack against Kuwait during

1990, then,

when the Council already has taken

such measures- namely economic sanctions against Iraq and the dispatch of naval
forces to regional waters to enforce against Iracj, Kuwait's right to resist no longer

existed, because the Security Council passed several resolutions on this crisis, and

an action was therefore taken.

^'^

Another plausible interpretation

is

that self-defensive action

is

permitted until

the Security Council takes action that definitely restores and maintains international

peace and security.

Since the economic sanctions showed no signs of forcing

out of Kuwait, continued

self- defensive

action by Kuwait and

despite the Security C-ouncil's adoption of economic sanctions.
Article 39 indicates that "measures necessary"

Security Council selects, and also

measures

shall

betaken

international peace.

in

its allies is

Ira<i

permitted

^^

means whatever measures the

empowers the Security Council

to "decide

what

accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore

Further, Article 39

is

the

first

Article in Chapter VII of the

Charter, which includes Article 41 (allowing economic sanctions, embargo, and sev-

erance of diplomatic relations), Article 42 (allowing collective police action) and
Article 51.

"

According to the Charter, therefore,
C-ouncil to determine

peace and security.

what types

of

it

is

within the province of the Security

measures are necessary to restore international

These measures may be

listed in Articles 41

economic sanctions, embargo, severance of diplomatic
action. Thus,
'"'^'Plofcha.u,
^^1(1.

if

42, such as

relations, or collective police

the Security Council passes a resolution calling for an embargo, the

supra note 45, at 341.

at 342-343.

^"^EUiott, supra

and

note 46, at 68.
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Council

lias cxj)i("sse(l its deterniiiiatioii of
^"^

of international peace.

As

the measure necessary lor the restoration

far as Article 51

is

concerned, various scholars have given their opinion and

following are a few of tlieni. First, as Professor
suggests,
is

a

Abram Chayes

nation could exercise the right of self-defense

of

Harvard Law School

when the Security Council

debating a situation "with no likelihood of a serious substantive outcome.'" As an

exanii)le,

he states that when the Security Council was immobilized by reciprocal

vetoes during the Cold War, "a state acting in individual or collective self-defense

could not be expected to forego continuing action simply because the Council was

debating the situation" with no prospect for passage of a resolution.
Professor

Thomas Franck and

Faiza Patel of

New York

^^

Similarly,

University School of

Law

argue that the right of self-defense, suspended by a collective police action, might
revive

if

the Council

became blocked from taking necessary measures.

^^

Second,

Professor Chayes proposes that a nation's right of self-defense might not be limited

when the Security Council's
of the situation."

^'^

action

is

"plainly in

Rarely has a nation acted independently based on the Security

Council's failure to take the measures necessary.

The
occurs,"

correct
is

meaning

also

commensurate with the seriousness

open

of the

^^

two phrases, "inherent right" and

to debate.

^^

of important to note that Article 51 does not use the

much narrower concept

of

an armed attack

Professor Kelsen writes that:

restricts the right of that the right applies only against "an
is

"if

[T]he (Jharter

armed attack" ....

It

term "aggression" but the

"armed attack," which means that a merely "imminent"

Chayes, The Use of Force in the Persicm Gulf, Address at the U.S. -Soviet
(onfereiice on the Non-Use of Force, at 9 (Oct. 4, 5, and 6, 1990).
"Thomas Franck & Fazia Patel, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign
''''Al)raui

Relations Law, 85
'''Elliott,

Am.

J. Int'l L. 3

supra note 46, at 69.

^''Id.

''^WarriiLer, supra note 44, at 52.

(1990).

i

38
attack or any act of aggression which [does] not [have] the character oi an attaclv
involving the use of

armed

force does not justify resort to force as an exercise of

the right established by Article 51.

^^

Scholars have construed this language as a

limitation or restriction on the traditional right of self-defense.

Based ui)on the examination of the founding documents pertaining to Article
and from the examination of the founding documents relevant to Chapter VIII

.")!,

U.N. (/barter on regional arrangements,

of the

self-defense should exist at

prohibit
It

its

exercise.

all

has been argued that the right of

times unless the Security Council were to specifically

''"

could therefore be concluded that the right of self-defense

can only be limited

if

state action

principles of the Charter, or

if

is

in direct

is

fundamental and

contravention of the purposes and

the Security Council takes explicit action to limit this

'''

right.

4.5

it

Article 106 of the Charter

Article 106 states that, prior to the conclusion of the special agreements, in order for

the Security Council to exercise

its

responsibilities

under Article

42:

"The

parties to

the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall

accordance with the i)rovisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with

in

one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations
with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as
for

may be

the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."

referred to in the Article are the
'"'^Haiis

four states

permanent members of the Security Council.

Kelsen, Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes, 37 A.J.I.L. 401-402

1943).
''"Plofchau, supra note 45, at 372.
'^^Id.

The

necessary

at 373.
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The wording

is

uiicleai a.l)Out

joint action" inckides a

duty to actually take action, and also as to whether

sul^ject of the consultation

Security Council.

whether the duty to consult "with a view to such

even has to include the measures decided upon by the

^^

According to Professor Hans Kelsen, Article 106
tions: either

made

has

(i)

is

susceptible to two interpreta-

the Five Powers can take joint action only after the Security Council

a determination under Article 39; or

independent of the Security Council and

may

(ii)

the Five Powers are completely

take joint action

necessary to maintain international peace and security.

^^

He

under Article 39 as more compelling.

when they

see as

sees the first view,

makes a determination

that joint action can only be taken after the Security Council

In the

tlie

^'^

Gulf Wa.r situation, the Security Council, by determining there

breach of international peace and security, obligated

itself to

w-as

a

decide what measures

not involving the use of force needed to be taken under Article 41, and impliedly

authorized the Five Powers to consult with each other (and

with other

member

if

the occasion required

states) with a view to taking joint action.

*^^

Simultaneously,

acting under Article 42, the Security Council sought a voluntary resolution of the
crisis Ijy calling

its

forces

upon Iraq

from Kuwait.

to

comply with a provisional measure: the withdrawal

of

*'*'

Further, the exact nature of the relationship between Article 106 and C^hapter

MI

is

unclear.

*"

Article 106 authorizes "joint action" by the Five powers, yet this

''^Gihnan, supra note 9, at 1139.

"^HANS KELSEN, THE
*'''A/.

Sc(:

Timothy

LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mcllniail,

No-Fly Zones:

exclusion re(jimes over Bosnia and Iraq, 11 Loy. L.A. Int'l
''^''Gihna.u,
'••\S.C.
(>7

supra note

Res. 660, U.N.

"Gihuan, supra note

9, at

& Comp.

45th

1143.

Sess.,

.

L.J. 35 (1994).

1146.

SCOR,
9, at

760 (1950)

The imposition and enforcement of air

U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1991).

10
hat "action" refers to military action, but, what

term

is

undefiiKMl.

clem

is

wluit ([ualifies siuli action as "joint."

It

is

clcai

t

is

less

^

Since Article 106 does not expressly require unanimity of purpose, a

more

flexible

interpretation of Article lOG permits action without strict unanimity of purpose

among

i^ernianent

paralysis.

Members, thereby making

it

a viable solution to Security Council

"'-*

Until now, however, the Security Council

members have never voted

to adopt res-

olutions while acknowledging that any threat determination authorizes independent

joint-enforcement action by Permanent Members.

^^

Question as to the functional competence (Article 24(1) or the

4.6

Charter)
Question as to functional competence, meaning 'implied competence' mostly concerns the interpretation of Art.

24.

All the questions of

competence involved,

obvious reasons, the problem of the interpretation of the Charter.

On

for

'^

the i)oint of 'the capacity of an international organization to expand and the

limits set to its

freedom are both determined by

its

functions,' the

ICJ declared;

"[T]he rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must

depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its
constituent documents and developed in practice. '^ Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which,
though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties
"

73

'''''Tiniothy

rejlimvs over

'^KAHNG,
'''

Mclhuail, No-fly zones:

Bosnia and

supra note 13, at 93.

Reparations Case, 1949

'•^r/.

at 182.

The imposition and enforcement of air exclusion

Iraq, 11 Loy. L.A. Int'l &:

I.C..T.

ISO.

Conip. L.J. 35, 62 (1994).

41

As

December

of

enij^owerecl

1946, there arose a question whether the Security Couiu

under the Charter to assume responsibihties

pcndenre of the Free Territory of Trieste.
10 .laniiary 1947, a

^'^

for the integrity

il

and

At the 9ist meeting of the Couik

was

iiidc-

il

ow

second meeting on the case, the Council heard a statement of

the Secretary- General in which he presented the following interpretation of Article
24 of the Charter:

The words

"jirimary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-

national peace and security," coupled with the phrase, "acts on their

power sufficiently wide to enable the Secuapprove the documents in question and to assume the

behalf," constitute a grant of

Council to

rity

responsibilities arising therefrom.

Furthermore, the records of the fourteenth meeting of the Committee

San Francisco, demonstrate that the Security Council was not
and
XII. In the discussion, all the delegations which spoke, including both
proponents and opponents of this amendment, recognized in this discussion that the responsibility that the responsibility to maintain peace and
security carried with it a power to discharge this responsibility. This
power, it was noted, was not unlimited, but subject to the purposes and
^^
principles of the United Nations.
III/I at

restricted to the specific powers set forth in Chapters VI, VII, VIII

In

handling of questions relating to competence, the Council has necessarily

concerned

itself

with the interpretation of those provisions of the Charter which

related to the functions of the C'ouncil under specific situations

Most

significant

development appears to have been made

and disputes.

''^

in the field of the

implied power of the Security Council: Not only the power to determine the nature of
a disj)ute

when

"legally" there

no longer existed a dispute and the power to undertake

territorial administration together

power

with accompanying responsibilities, but also the

to establish a non-enforcement force,

the intention of the host state, and authorize

'''KAHNG,

sxipia note 13, at 75.

"'S.C.O.R., 91st mtg., pp 44-45.
"''KAHNG, sajmi note 13, at 94.

determine
it

its

functions irrespective of

to use force for the purpose of,

among

42
others, pieventiiig n civil vvai,

may

be regarded to have been established. " The

all

cninulative effect of this development
])ovver of

the Council

may

still

expand

may be
in yet

such that the scojje of the iniplicd

unknown

direction.

Overview

4.7

There are no

where

specific categories of legal disputes

it

may be

reasonably antici-

pated that the Security Council would follow a certain pattern of handling them and
giving

its legal

opinion.

'*

Whether the

the construction of customary

lavv,

of nationalization, the Council

may

in

the context of each case.

Although

its

legal question

be on the revision of treaty,

or a principle of international law, or the legality

follow a course of action

it

considers appropriate

'^

practice demonstrates that

undoubtedly

it is

the greater role in the Security Council and that

it

is

politics

which played

a function of politics, and

not of law, to promote the functional interplay and even integration of the law and
politics,

a change towards the better side in

since the collapse of the east-west
It

power

has followed exclusively the

first

its

politics

of the

reaction to an international crisis

cannot be overlooked.

numerous methods

interpretation anticipated by the San Francisco Conference,
of Articles 2(7)

and 51

"Id. at 108-109.
~^Id. at 226.
''"Id.

illustrates the

same.

^^

and

of the Charter

its

interpretation

Chapter

5

Implementation of International Legal principles

The Security Council

5.1

All individual state being its

has lacked

and

a,

it

enforcement authority

own law enforcement

agent, International legal order

general central law enl'orceinent authority to enforce international norms

ol)ligatioiis in

law, as

as an

day-to-day international transactions.

has evolved particularly after World

War

II,

^

Modern

has centralized international

use of force to the extent that military enforcement measures

under the authority of the U.N. Security Council or
self-defense within the

A

bounds

of Article 51.

international

may be

applied only

in cases of individual or collective

^

substantial array of tools with which the Security Council could pursue

l)rimary mission of maintaining international peace and security

'^

its

are contained in

C'hapters VI, and V'll of the Charter, which grants the Security Council

immense

powers to perform the enforcement function. The various methods as contained

Chapter VI include diplomatic action, such
ation

among member

nations,

''

as facilitating consultation

in

and negoti-

instituting investigations with binding force,

and

such other measures of conflict prevention, and making recommendations by means
ol resolutions
.Tost

oj tlu

with a view to

Del])nick,

A

a pacific

settlement of disputes.

inoTe ejfeciive international law or a

Development of international law

new

"luorld

law"?-Sojne aspects

in a clianginy international system,

68

Iiid.

L..T.

705, 720 (1993).
^Id.

a.t

721.

Maury D.

Sheiik,

The United Nations Security Council Consultation Act:

for multilateral resolution, of international conflict, 28 Stan.

Ud.
43

.J.

Iiit'l

L. 247,

A

proposal

252 (1991).

44

The

Security Council has been involved in numerous disputes as a quasi judirial

body, and has dealt with
1

all

kinds of questions, l)oth legal and political.

The

resolu-

ions |)asse(l by the Security C^ouncil for settlement of the disputes reflect the Security

('onnciTs perspective of international law and constitutes the measures taken by the

The

Security douncil to inii)lenient the International law.

forum

serves as a

among

for informal consultations

its

relaxed negotiations and effective conflict resolution.

Security C'ouncil also

members thereby

facilitating

^

("hapter VII of the U.N. ('barter, which sets forth the Security Council's powers

responding to the threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggres-

for

sion,

is

intended by the framers of the Charter to be "the teeth of the United

Nations."

*'

Significant

among

these include the Security Council's authority to

"determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and to

make recommendations,

or decide

what measures

shall

be taken

in

accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."

'

The enforcement measures

include, imposition of

sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations,

non aggressive military action, such

^

economic and military

the use of collective

as dispatching

armed

force,

'^

and

and maintaining peacekeeping

missions.

5.2

Sanctions

Sanctions assume a punitive nature by representing the "penalty attached to transgression and breach of international law" in the form of "punitive actions initiated

by a number of international actors, particularly a world organization such as the
^Id. at 252-253.
*'/f/.

tions

See Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions, compliance and international law: Reflec-

on the United Nations' erperience against

'U.N. Charter

art. 39, ch. VII.

^U.N. Charter

art. 41, ch. VII.

'm.N. Charter

art. 42. ch. VII.

Iraq,

32 Va.

J. Iiit'l L. 1

(1991).
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League of Nations or the United Nations, against one or more states
a

for violating

universally approved Charter, as inducements to follow, or refrain from lollovving,
^"

that particular course of conduct and conform with international law."

One

of the

most

significant objectives of the use of sanctions

its

behavior

is

to send a clear

which the penalties are being imposed)

signal to the target state (the state against
that,

is

unacceptable to the international community, constituting

a

service of notice that further illegal action or continuation of the present illegal
a.cti(ni

may

lead to

more

serious measures.

There are various forms

^^

of sanctions, for

example, there are moral and

dijilo-

matic sanctions, which attempt to effectively isolate the target state in terms of
public opinion or official diplomatic recognition, economic sanctions, that seek to

achieve political goals through the isolation of the target state's

economy by using

techniques such as boycotts, embargoes, blockades, asset freezes, financial transaction restrictions,

and other economic

tactics,

maritime sanctions,

etc.

was again given

In framing the Charter of the United Nations, special attention
to the use of
security,

economic sanctions

as part of a

^^

more sophisticated system

and the Security Council has resorted to sanctions

as

one of

its

of collective

enforcement

action sunder Chapter VII of the Charter during the following occasions: First, in
1*)()(),

comprehensive economic sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia

after a unilateral

declaration of independence from Britain by the government of Ian Smith.

The

second instance involved an arms embargo against South Africa, imposed in 1977

and wliich continues to the present day.

The most

recent instances of sanctions

authorized by the Security C'ouncil pertains to Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti.
^'^Joyiier,

M

at 3.

i^/r/.

at 4.

11

bupra note

G, at 2-3.

Ifi

The

uiiipty

number

of resolutions passed by the Security Council with respect to

sanctions collectively represent the exercise of Security Council authority to restore

and

iutcrnatioiial peace

The
and

stability.

cases discussed below -nvolve one or

their detailed discussion depicts the

implemented those

more

manner

in

principles of international law,

which the Security Council has

principles.

Some instances of Security Council's performance

5.3

5.3.1

Congo

Shortly after the former Belgian

Congo became independent on June

30, 19G0, the

Moise Tshombe, with military and other support of

])rovince of Katanga, under

Belgium seceded from the new Republic and declared

itself

independent.

^^

While the Security Council did not adopt the view that the Belgian troop's
presence constituted aggression,

Congolese sovereignty and

it

made

Katanga an international one.

agreed with the argument that the troops violated

the dispute between the Congolese government and

^'^

Security Council Resolution 143 (1960) called upon Belgium to withdraw

troops from the territory of the Republic of the
rity C'ouncil

Congo (now

Zaire).

^^

its

Secu-

Resolution 145 (1960), while recognizing that the Congo had been

admitted to U.N. membership "as a unit"

^"^

from any action which might undermine the

called

on

all

governments to refrain

territorial integrity

and the

political

independence of the republic of the Congo. Security Council Resolution 169 (1961)
Eastwood, Secession: State practice and international law after the disUnion and Yugoslavia^ 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 304-307 (1993).
Ma.ttler, The distinction between civil luars and international wars and its

^•^La.wreiice S.

solution of the Soviet
^'^Michael
lecjal

.1.

implications,

2()

N. Y.U.J.

Int'l fe Pol.

SCOR,
U.N. SCOR,

662 (1994).

^'S.C. Res. 143, U.N.

15th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960).

^'\S.C. Res.

15th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/15 (1960).

145,

47
strongly

(le])lore(l ''secessionist activities

and armed action now being carried

(;ii

by

the provincial administration of Katanga" and comj)letely rejected "the claim that

Katanga

refrain

'"to

^'

a 'sovereign and independent nation'."

is

from any action which

])ur])Oses of

may

the United Nations in the

It

requested

directly or indirectly

Congo and

is

all

member

impede the

contrary to

its

states

policies

and

decisions and the

general i)uri)oses of the ('barter."

The

case of

Katanga highlighted

several principles of U.N. policy: Colonial Ixn-

ders are to be maintained sacred and secession from an existing state
disturl)ances within the borders
forces will not be tolerated;

denied

in cases

question.

a

Member

State foreign aid to non-governmental

and most importantly, recognition

where '"independence"

is

as a state should be

grounded upon secession of the territory

in

^^

Novenil)er 11, 1965, the minority white government of Southern Rhodesia under

the premier ship of Ian Smith declared the country independent.

declaration of independence was promptly
the Security Council to

recommend

The Sanctions

resolution called

condemned by the U.N.,

upon

inter alia,

states,

"illegal

Rhodesia, and furthermore, not to assist or encourage the

SCOR,

^^

unilateral

and caused

not to recognize or

authority" in Southern
"illegal

regime" and the

16th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961).

D. Van Der Vyver, Statehood in international

^^.1.

The

^^

uphold diplomatic or other relations with the

I'S.C. Res. 169, U.N.

^^

sanctions against the regime that professed to

constitute the government of the territory.

to

civil

Rhodesia

5.3.2

On

if

taboo; in

is

laic,

5

Emory

Int'l L.

Rev.

9,

36-37

(1991).
'^Da.vid

Am.

.T.

D. Caron, Tlic legitimacy of

Int'l L.

tlie

collective authority of the Security Council, 87

579 (1993).

'^"S.C. Res. 216,

U.N.

'^^S.C. Res. 217,

U.N.

SCOR,
SCOR,

20th Yr., U.N. Doc. S/INF/20 (1965).
20th Yr., U.N. Doc. S/INF/20 (1965).
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"racist .settler ininority in

proclaimed positively that the situation

(19fiG)

the i)eace,

'^"^

in the history of the

Pursuant to Article
viohition of

in

Resolution 221

Rhodesia constituted a threat to

U.N. imposed mandatory sanctions under

VII of the U.N. Charter against a political community.

C'hai)ter

flicts.

in

il

and was followed by Security Council Resolution 232, (196G) which
time

for the first

vene

Southern Rhodesia." Security Coiuk

human

3!).

^^

the Security Council could characterize any extreme

rights principles as a "threat to peace,"

and therefore

inter-

domestic situation which would potentially erupt into international con-

in
^'^

The

Security Council, by enacting Sanctions against the Ian Smith regime

Southern Rhodesia, justified

this intervention

by characterizing these policies as

disturbance[s] of international peace" and "threat[s] to international peace and
security.

^''

The problem

in

Southern Rhodesia brought two particular issues onto the agenda

on non-recognition: The emphasis on racism
"'illegal

in the

composition and practices of the

regime," and the question of self-determination of peoples.

the people of Southern Rhodesia "to determine their

paragraph

7 of

own

^^

The

right of

future" was mentioned in

Security C'ouncil Resolution 217 (1965) and reiterated in paragraph 4

of Security Council Resolution 232 (1966).

The Rhodesian problem came

ending with Security Council Resolution 460 (1977),

in

to a

happy

which the Security Council

ai)plauded the Lancaster House Agreement which culminated in the independence
of

Zimbabwe

in 1980,

^^S.C. Res. 221, U.N.

and terminated the mandatory sanctions.

SCOR,

^^

21st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/R.es/221 (1966).

"S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st

Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/232 (1966).
Hutchinson, Restoriiiy hope: U.N. Security Council lesolutions Jot Somalia
aiul an expanded doctrine of Humanitarian intervention, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 636 (1993).

Mark

to

R..

'Barbara M. Tocker, Intervention in the Yugoslav civil war: The United Nations'
create an international criminal tribunal., 12 Dick .J. Int'l L. 541 (1994).
^"Vyver, supra note 18, at 38.
2^S.C. Res. 460, U.N.

SCOR,

34th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/Res/460 (1979).

right
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The South African Homeland States

5.3.3

Puisuaiit to the policy of apartheid, the South African
total ten regions in the eount ry as
ta.ns"

for ethnically

)

"homelands"

dehned sections

(initially

government demarcated a
they were called "Bantus-

of the Black (African) population.

refused to recognize the "independence" of

all

'^^

The

II.

N.

those territories that applied to the

South African government of "independence" and were granted that status.

-^'^

In

Resolution 417 (1977), the Security Coimcil called on South Africa to "[ajbolish the
policy of bantustanization, abolish the policy of apartheid
l)a,sed

on justice and equality."

The President
September

The

^^

of the Security Council, at the 2168th

21, 1979,

made

and ensure majority rule

the following statement:

Security Council calls upon

meeting of the Council on

'^^

Governments

deny any form of
recognition to the so-called "independent" bantustans, to refrain from
any dealing with them and to reject travel documents issued by them, and
urges all Member Governments to take effective measures to prohibit all
individuals, corporations and other institutions under their jurisdiction
from having any dealings with the so-called "independent" bantustans.
all

to

Non-recognition of the homeland states was prompted by considerations founded

on the right to self-determination and the international censure of racial discrimination

and apartheid, and here too, there might soon emerge a happy ending.

5.3.4

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Cy])rus

became an independent

^^

state in 1960, and from the outset, suffered under

the rivalry of the deeply divided Greek and the Turkish factions of

its

population.

^'^Vyver, supra note 18, at 39.
'^'^Sd

Henry

.1.

Richardson

mdrprn.den.ce, 78 Arn.

.J.

*"S.C. Res. 417, U.N.

III,

Int'l L.

Constitutive questions in the negotiations for

Namibiun

79 (1984).

SCOR, 32nd

Sess., U.N. Doc. S/R,es/417 (1977).
^^U.N. Doc. S/13549, submitted at the 2168th meeting of the Security Council on Sept,

21, 1979.

^^Vyver, supia note 18, at 41.

Following

rill

abortive coup

in lf)74,

executed by the Cyprian National Cuaid and

backed by Greece, Turkey invaded the island by

weapons and ecpiipment.

siii)i)lied

The

.sea

and

with United States

air

"^^

Security Council declared attempts to create the Turkish R.ejjublic ot

Northern Cyprus to be invalid, deplored the "purported secession" of that region,

and (ailed upon states to respect the sovereignty, independence,
<ind

territorial integrity

non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, while at the same time also urging

them not

any Cyprian state other than the Republic of Cyprus.

'^^

East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

5.3.5

Since

to recognize

its

establishment on

conflict with its

May

15,

Arab neighbors.

1948, the state of Israel has been in constant

War

Following the Six-Day

of 1967, Israel took

possession of East .Jerusalem and the territory west of the Jordan River,
the West Bank, which

it

had captured from Jordan and

Heights, which was part of Syria.

The

Israeli

known

laid claim to the

as

Golan

^^

government's claim to annex the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem

through municipal law was a violation of the fundamental rule of international law.

"One of the most basic elements
defender to preserve

its

in the

law of self-defense

is

that

it

only authorizes a

existing values and not to acquire those of an enemy,

and the

consistent history provides convincing evidence of the expansion of Israeli perceived
interests or values as

opposed to their conservation."

^"^

^'^Eugene T. Rossides, Cypiiu'i and the rule of law, 17 Syracuse

J. Int'l

& Com.

24 (1991).

^''vyver, supra note 18, at 43.
^''Id.

at 45.

^''Martin Feinrider, The control of violence in an lebanese context, 77
L.

Pioc. 182-183 (1983).

Am.

Soc"y

Int'l

51

The U.N.
the

l)asic

which

aunulinent of Israel's claim to the occupied territories on

lourifled its

premise of contemporary international law, particularly, the use of
inadmissible.

is

Kuwait

5.3.G

Ou August

2,

1990,

Iracji

in. Iraxi

(x)uncil resjionded
of aggression.

its

8,

Iraq formally annexed Kuwait; on August

instructed the foreign governments to close their embassies and consulates

Kuwait by August

The

24;

and on August

28, the 19th Iracji governorate.

promptly and with unprecedented vigor to

Security Council

condemned

Iraq for

Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter against

rescind

'^''^

its

l)e

its

"^^

Iraq, affecting all trade

with Iraq and

demanded

declaration of the "merger" of the two countries, and called on

of the

pause of good

'*^

'^^

do

so,

all

states

paved the way

for

followed by such

recalling Iraq's refusal to

above resolutions and allowing Iraq one

will," to

that Iraq

annexation and to refrain from any action that

interpreted as recognition of Iraq's claim to Kuwait,

comply with any

article

demanded

imposed mandatory sanctions under

other resolutions, and finally passed the Resolution 678,

"as a

Security

hack's unlawful acts

invasion of Kuwait and

declared the annexation of Kuwait "null and void",

anfl institutions not to recognize the

might

The

^^

immediate and unconditional withdrawal,

Kuwait,

Emir and

military forces invaded Kuwait, unseated the

took contr(^l of the covuitry; on August

in

force,

final

opportunity,

armed intervention under

42 of the U.N. Charter.

Lois E. Fielding, Maritime interception: Centerpiece of economic sanctions in the

world order, 53 La. L. Rev. 1214 (1993).
^'^S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/660 (1990).
•'^'^S.C.

Res. 661, U.N.

'^"S.C. Res.

SCOR,

45th

Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/R.es/661 (1990).

662 (1990) passed unanimously.

new

War

einijtecl in the ])eisiaii

Gulf on January

Ki,

1991,

when

allied forces

from

twenty-eight countries began the offensive authorized by Security C/'ouncil Resohition
()7S

(1990) to liberate Kuwait.

clearly

'^^

Non-recognition of the Iraqi claim to Kuwait

is

founded on the salient rule of international law against aggression.

On two

occasions during the debate over Iraq and Kuwait, the Security Council

ordered the Collective use of force in the

by Chapter VII.

name

of international law

and

as authorized

'^^

The Charter moved beyond

the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as the signatories renounced

not only their right to go to war, absent circumstances of individual or collective
self-defense, but their right to resort to the threat or use of force as well.

These

proscriptions on aggression were to been forced through a systematic procedure

authorizing collective force against an aggressor nation.

5.3.7

'^'^

Offensive Administration of a Foreign Territory

South West Africa, which was colonized by Germany
latter, throvigh

in 1884,

was awarded by the

the Peace Treaty of Versailles, to South Africa to be administered

by her as "an integral portion of the Union of South Africa" in accordance with the
rules applicable to

C Mandate

territories.

West Africa attracted the attention
in

''^

South Africa's administration of South

of the U.N.,

and

this issue eventually

culminated

the termination by the General Assembly in 1966 and Security Council in 1969
'^'^Vyver,

supra note 18, at 54.

'*'Cliristoi)her

John Sabec,

Intf rudfional letjal

response to

Council conies of aye:
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait^ 21 Ga.

Tlic Security

63 (1991). Sec John F. Miiri)hy, Whatever happened

to the

An

Analysis of the

J. Int'l

new world order?

& Comp.
19 S.

111.

L.

U.

L.J. 113 (1994).
''''Sal)ec,

supra note 41.

"''Christian J. Gaxris,
L.

Rev.

i();-;9.

Bosnia and

1069-1070 (1994).

the limitations of international law, 34

Santa Clara

53
of

t

he Maiuhite, and

Namihia,

in

March

t'ollovviug

a further lengthy dispute, finally the independence of

^''

lf)!)0.

South Africa's administration of Namibia implicated the right of the Namibian
people to choose

norm remains

how they would be governed-their

in constant tension

right of self-determination,

which

with other rights and principles-the principles of

"sovereign equality, non-intervention, the non-use of force, and the maintenance of
territorial integrity

The

and

political

independence."

"*'

Security Council, in Security Council Resolution 264 (1969), expressed the

opinion that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was "illegal and

contrary to the principles of the Charter and the previous decisions of the United

Nations and

is

detrimental to the interests of the population of the Territory and

those of the international community," and called on South Africa to withdraw

its

administration from the territory.
It

passed several Resolutions in this regard and finally passed Resolution 283

l)efore

submitting the issue to the ICJ for advisory opinion, requesting

"to refrain

all

states

from any relations - diplomatic, consular or otherwise - with South

Africa implying recognition of the authority of the
the Territory of Namibia," and called on

all

Government

states that

of

South Africa over

maintained diplomatic or

consular relations with South Africa to issue a formal declaration stating that they

do not recognize any authority of South Africa with regard to Namibia and consider
South Africa's continued presence

'*'Sushnia Soni, Reyimcs
•T.

foi-

in

the territory to be

Nnniihia's independence:

A

illegal.

"^^

Comparative study, 29 Coluni.

Trausnat'l L. (1991).

283 U.N. SCOR. 25th Yr., U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970). See Geoffrey R..
Watson, Constitutionalizm, Judicial i-eview and the World Court, 34 Harv. Int'l L..J. 18
^^S.C. Res.

(1993).
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The Iraq-Iran War and the War Against

5.3.S

The 1980-88 IraqTran War and

Iraqi Aggression

War Against

the 1990-91

Iraqi Aggression, taken

together, have provided the context for the most frequent application since 1945
of the rules of international law relating to the rights at sea of neutrals during the

former war, and the application of maritime sanction to non-belligerents and others
during the

latter.

''^

During the eight-year course of
ents attacked
state-flag

No
fire

more than 400 commercial

merchant men.

existing

on

a

hostilities

norm

vessels,

all

of

two

belliger-

which were neutral-

'''^'

flying a neutral flag

neutral commerce, and attacks

merely because

upon neutral merchant

ventured into specified area of the high seas

is

it

is

engaged

in

open
non-

vessels simply because they

invalid under International

Law.

^^

Security C'ouncil Resolution 661 (1990), adopted on August 6th under

Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, decided that
3.

almost

Iran, the

or international agreement gives a belligerent the right to

merchant vessel

The U.N.

between Iraq and

(a) the

import into their

all

territories of all

states shall prevent:

commodities and products

originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the

....

present resolution;
(c)

the sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using

their flag vessels of

any commodities or products, including weapons or

any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes,
and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body
in Iraq or Kuwait
'^''^.Tohn

H. McNeill, Neutral Rights and Maritime Sanctions:
J. Int'l L.

in the Persian

Gulf between 1984 f"^d 1991:

(1091)..
''"Peace, supra note 49.
''Id.

631 (1991).

The

effect of

two Gulf

Sec also David L. Peace, Major maritime events

Wars^ 31 Va.

A

juridical analysis, 31 Va.

J. Int'l L.
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Fuitliei resolutions ot the Security ('ouiiril clarified the situation with regard to

enforcing economic sanctions at sea. Paragraph

was explicit

1

of Resolution 005 (1990) of

August

in recording that the Security Council:

upon those member states cooperating with the Government of
Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to sue su( h
measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and
outward shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to insure strict implementation of the provisions related to
Calls

such shipping laid down

The Charter,
United Nations

a.t

least

two ways:

gives the Security Council the

members (Art
neutral.

Resolution 661 (1990).

the abstract, limits the sovereignty of the

in

in

in

power

25) thereby denying

to

self-

first

commit

member

Use of force by individual states

is

defense;

states their

name

customary

right to

of all

remain

not permitted under Chapter VII of the
force.

Preemptory rules of General International Law

Article 53 of the

Vienna Convention defines a preemptory norm of general

national law as "a
of states as

held to

l)e

norm accepted and recognized by

a whole as a

international plane

some

is

law can derogate.
o'

Law

inter-

community

permitted."

of the provisions of the United Nations Charter

''^Vienna Convention on the

A/CONF.

the international

norm from which no derogation

jus Cogens, or fundamental

ol international

Doc.

of the

and second, the Charter

forces collectively, in the

U.N. C'harter. Force could be used only under a U.N.

5.4

membership

norms against which other treaty

^'^

On

the

have been
or source

^'^

of Treaties,

opened

for signature,

May

23, 1969,

U.N.

39/27

""^George K. Walker,

United States national security law and United Nations Peace-

kccjntuj or pcacaniakint] operations, 29

Wake

Forest L. Rev. 447 (1994).

Therefore

norms

it

could be argued that, pursuant to the Charter provisions, several

of inteniational law invoked by the U.N.

and the

I.C.J, in the

above instances,

to wit:

and of the acquisition of territory by
means of force (the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, East .Jerusalem
and other territories occupied by Israel, the Iraqi invasion and annexation
of Kuwait, and South Africa's continued presence in Namibia);
(a) the prohibition of aggression

(b) denial of the right to self-determination (Katanga,

African homeland

Rhodesia, the

Turkish Republic of Northern

South
Cyprus, East Jerusalem and other territories occupied by Israel, and
South Africa's administration of South West Africa/Namibia); and
(c)

states,

the

the prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid(Rhodesia, the

South African homeland states, and South Africa's administration of
^"^
South West Africa/Namibia).

The above-mentioned norms
(jus cogens).

5.5

are

all

preemptory

rules of general international law

^^

Major procedural impediments to a proper implementation

Two major

procedural impediments have historically limited the effectiveness of the

Security Council in responding to particular international conflicts: the veto power
of the five

permanent members

of the security Council,

take initiative in addressing international disputes.

failure to

^^

The Veto

5.5.1

The veto

privilege guaranteed that no

the consent of

most

and the Council's

all five

major action could be undertaken without

permanent members.

The veto power remains one

significant obstacles to the effective workings of the Security Council.

'•''Vyver,
••'Vfi.

^'

As a

supra note 18, at 65.

See also

'''Sheiik,

of the

J.

DUGGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

supra note

3, at 25().

•'"Gallant, supra p. 28

and note

10, at 899.

(1987).

result of their special privilege, the five

power and singular

tional

interests,

permanent members, with

have precluded the Security Council from acting

according to the purposes of the United Nations.
limited Security Council action in virtually

However, increasing respect
East-West ])oIarization

all

""^

In other words, the veto j^ower

areas of international conflict.

for international conflict resolution,

post-Cold

in the

their disproixn-

War

^^

and decreased

era have reduced partisan inclinations

and the number of conflicts that permanent members of the Security Council perceive
to a.ttect their vital interests,

The second

.

^"

principal barrier to Security Council's effectiveness

international disputes,

.

facilitated consensus.

Lack of Initiative

5.5.2

.

and

for

somebody

....

to submit the matter to
its

it." ^^

own

referred to by the Secretary General or any other

prompt and

effective

forestalled aiiv action.

•'''^Slienk,

supia note

''"W. at 258.
'''Id.

3, at

256.

that "in too

many

the Council has taken no initiative, but has waited

Security Council did not take an action on

failure to take

is

.

Under many circumstances the

initiative.

The problem was

either

member. The Security Council's

measure has been another major obstacle that

Chapter

G

Conclusion

Maiiitenauce

oi

peace and security

is

the primary concern of today's world, and the

aLsohite responsibihty of ensuring world peace

order to accomplish this goal,

it

is

is

placed on the Security Council. In

very crucial that the Security Council appropri-

ately interpret the applicable Charter principles of international law

and

effectively

enforce them.

The

('barter that grants

enormous powers

this task, also sets forth the rules,

the Security Council in

on

its

its

actions.

methods and procedures, which are binding upon
Such limitations on

its

power has a great impact

functioning as a principal organ of the world organization.

Some

of the Charter provisions, especially those that relate to the

and procedure of the Security Council
interpretations. This also has

ment

to the Security Council to carry out

of its tasks.

The

shows that

it

Charter

view of

in

itself,

had negative

are quite vague
effects

competence

and are open

to various

on the Security Council's

Security C'ouncil's preference for

its

own

fulfill-

interpretation clearly

wishes to give an authoritative interpretation to the provisions of the

peace and security.

its

primary responsibilities

for the

maintenance of international

^

Further, the Security C'ouncil does not strictly abide by procedure laid

down by

the ('barter for handling disjnites. For instance, the Charter requires the Security
C^ouncil to refer legal disputes to the I.C.J.,

^

but through out the history of the

^TAE JIN KAHNG, LAW, POLITICS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
^U.N. Charter

art. 36(3).

58

232 (1969).

59
Security Council, only rarely have these formal procedures of handling legal questions

heen followed.

The

Security C-ouncil's function as a quasi-judicial body in interpreting and

applving international legal norms has been greatly criticized with respect to

its

resolution of disputes involving the substantial rights and duties of the states and

The

interpretation of treaties.

Security Council ought to submit such disputes to the

International Court of Justice, a

Since the Security Council

is

body more appropriate

to

perform such functions.

a political body, the interplay of law and politics

another factor that hampers the Council's successful interpretation and imple-

is

mentation of the international

performance clearly show that
Its

impact

is

legal principles.

it is

politics

such that, even today,

if

A

review of the Security Council's

which played a greater

any major power

is

role in the Council.

directly involved in a dis-

pute or a situation, the Security Council becomes handicapped and could not take

However,

any effective measures.
of the Charter
like tlie

in spite the fact that the task of interpretation

and other norms of international law especially

Security C'ouncil

Council's interpretation

is

is

undoubtedly a complicated one,

it

for a political

is

body

believed that the

greatly in conformity with the Charter and other princi-

'^

ples of international law.

Furthermore, as discussed

earlier,

some

of the Charter provisions that set forth

the legal principles are not clear and precise. This not only

Security Council to interpret

them

in

makes

it

difficult for

accordance with the purpose and object of the

United Nations, but also gives the Security Council an opportunity to exercise
discretion

and misuse

its

the

its

powers.

Until the end of the Cold War, the performance of the Security Council regarding

enforcement of international law was very static and mostly unsuccessful, primarily
^Mathias
.1.

.1.

Herdegen, the '"Constitutionalization" of the

Transnat'l L. 135 (1994).

UN Security System^ 27

Vand.

A

(A)

because

oi

the political clashes between the major powers and the excessive use of

veto. Since then

Most

it

has been acting with

of the recent,

more

vigor,

dynamism and

efficiency.

and some of the past enforcement measures undertaken by

the Security Council have proved to be a great achievement. In such instances, the

Security Council, by
stioiij;

gain
(

its

interpretation and implementation techniques, establishes a

louudation of the relevant principle[s] of international law, which there upon

more emphasis and

strength.

Considering the above-mentioned factors together with other causes like, lack of

funds, lack of cooperation
is

justified in failing to

hope, because

its

among

the permanent members,

prove to be very successful.

etc.,

the Security Council

Yet, the world

must not

lose

strengths and powers can never be undermined.
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